Part 2: The Resources
Yesterday, I went through the current state of the roster. Before moving on to likely scenarios, I wanted to more briefly summarize their likely assets, financial and in trade. The Jays say they plan to contend again, but also don’t show any signs of being willing to spend like the Mets, so it’s going to require some creativity.
Payroll Parameters
Right now, the Jays are projected by Cot’s Contracts to have $143.8 million committed against the luxury tax. Guaranteed contracts add up to $123.3m, but the luxury tax impact is only $114.8m, mostly because of Bo Bichette’s heavily back-loaded two year deal (since the tax number is based on average annual value).
Arbitration will add another big amount to the total. Vlad’s projection of $28.9m makes up the lion’s share, but Romano ($7.8m), Varsho ($7.4m), Kirk ($4.2m), and Swanson ($2.9m) are set for significant paydays too. Clement and Manoah have smaller projections at around $1.8m each. The team can also have Zach Pop for $1.3m and Dillon Tate for $1.6, but I’m going to assume that they aren’t tendered at that value by the deadline on the 22nd. Neither has done much in the past couple of seasons, and I think they’ll be able to find not meaningfully less valuable pieces on the waiver wire if they need them. The guys I’m pretty sure they will keep, or at least are near certain to tender, bring expected actual payroll to $178m and the luxury tax number to $169.5m.
Finally, for luxury tax accounting we have to add in the players making the minimum (12 of them heading into the offseason, including replacements for the just waived Genesis Cabrera plus Tate and Pop), 14 players in the minors but on the 40 man, and Cots’ rough estimate of player benefit costs. All in, those items add up to $31.4m, bringing the Jays’ current tax number to $200.9m.
Shi Davidi reported yesterday that the Jays believe that they just slid under the threshold for the 2024 season after paying it in 2023. The league will do its own calculations and has to confirm that assessment, but for now we’ll assume the team’s argument carries. That’s important for a couple of reasons.
First, it means that if they exceed the tax threshold in 2025 they’ll pay only a 20% penalty instead of the 50% rate for teams that have gone over three years in a row. The tax bill isn’t likely to be large unless they make a surprise splash this winter, but it’s good to have the option.
Second, and probably more importantly, they can sign a free agent who’s rejected a qualifying offer and forfeit only their second round pick and $500k from their international bonus pool. If they were taxpayers, they’d also lose a fifth rounder and the bonus pool fine would be $1m. I’m not sure that’s something they’ll actually want to do. We won’t know where exactly the Jays draft until the lottery is held on December 10th, but right now they have the fifth best odds (7.48%) of landing the first pick and they’re almost certain to be picking in the top 10 for just the third time in 20 years. The farm system is better than it was a year ago thanks to a fairly successful deadline and some positive development, but it’s still firmly in the bottom third of the league. Sacrificing a second rounder that’s likely to be about 40th overall would hurt, as would foregoing the prospect they could sign with half a million of international money. Getting under the tax reduces the price from unacceptable to just steep, but it would still require a very good fit to make it make a QO free agent make sense.
Davidi’s report also quotes Ross Atkins as saying that they don’t expect payroll to go either up or down in a big way in 2025. I would assume that means that they’re willing to get up to the tax line but would rather not go over, and certainly won’t approach the surcharge levels that begin $20m over the first threshold. The first tax threshold next season will be $241m, leaving $40.1m that they’re most likely able to spend and perhaps another $10-15m that they’d be willing to consider in the right circumstance. They won’t be keen to push right up to the first surcharge, because they’ll want room to add at the deadline without having to worry too much about triggering it.
The Farm
As I mentioned above, the farm is now deeper than it was but a lack of blue chip talent holds it towards the bottom of the rankings. It doesn’t help that a lot of the guys they might use as trade ammunition this winter are in or near MLB, so parting with them isn’t a clear “the future for 2025” exchange.
Horwitz and Jimenez are part of the MLB picture right now. Either might have significant value to a rebuilding team considering trading one or two seasons of a better established regular for a longer lease on a less proven one, but I don’t know whether either is well enough regarded to anchor a trade for an impact player. Will Wagner and Joey Loperfido fit this bill as well, but they were just the second and third pieces in a trade for a non-ace rental starter and I don’t see any reason why their stock around the league would be radically higher now.
Straddling the AAA/MLB line are Addison Barger and Orelvis Martinez. The latter has spent time on top 100 lists, and the former has had a case at times, but both of their stock is a little dented right now. Still, they have the kind of offensive upside that might interest a team that’s trying things out.
In Buffalo, Jake Bloss is a real piece who could definitely anchor a trade for a year or two of a starting calibre player, but then he’s also in the Jays’ rotation mix. Jonatan Clase also has value, although significantly less, and might be an option. Alan Roden and Josh Kasevich are more lightly regarded, but both have likely MLB roles and could cheaply fill a need on a contender.
Deeper in the farm, there isn’t much that wouldn’t be available. I’d be surprised if Arjun Nimmala was on the table, given both his up and down debut season and his potential. I’d also be shocked if Ricky Tiedemann were traded at the nadir of his value. Similarly, I would assume they hold onto Trey Yesavage and Khal Stephen until they’ve established pro track records. Everyone else would be on the block, but I’ve also just listed almost the whole top 10 of a not great system, so there’s nobody sitting farther down who looks both valuable and expendable. If the Jays can swing a significant 2025-oriented trade, it’ll have to be thinning out the AAA/MLB log jam to consolidate a couple of prospects into one established player, and they probably don’t have the firepower to go after a star period.
Scenarios
From here, I can see three basic paths forward. The first would be to tear it down. If Vlad and Bo aren’t inclined to sign extensions at rates the club considers reasonable and they risk losing them for just a qualifying offer next year, there’s at least a case for getting ahead and tearing it down now while those guys are trade-able and the likes of Varsho, Bassitt and Gausman could also bring real returns. I’m not going to consider that, though, mainly because if the actual club was then they’d have been a lot more aggressive sellers at the deadline and they’d also have fired Atkins. Stability at the top suggests that ownership’s expectation is at least a degree of stability overall, so drastic changes of course are off the table.
The second, which I’ll explore probably on Tuesday, is taking a reloading year. Extend Vlad, try to extend Bo, add some short term pitching that’s flippable at the deadline, and mostly give the young guys run to see who’s part of the future. That team couldn’t realistically contend, but it could hopefully get back to .500ish with money and a clearer idea of what’s needed to open a new window in 2026.
Finally, there’s the go for it option. This also involves extending Vlad and likely Bo, but also trying to fill some holes with quality free agents who’ll need multi-year deals and probably trading from the AAA/ young MLB depth that they have to consolidate some value. We can discuss potential options in that area next week.